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VI. NEUTRALITY AND THE LEGAL POSITION
OF WAR
A. THE TRADITIONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WAR AND
NEUTRALITY
The changes that have marked the international order since the advent
of the first World War undoubtedly have had a substantial effect upon the
institution of neutrality. At the same time the task of evaluating this
effect admits of no easy and wholly satisfactory solution. If anything, it
seems reasonably clear that the present status of neutrality is, and will
probably remain for some time to come, a matter over which considerable
controversy and divergence of opinion can be expected.
In part, this uncertainty must be attributed to the changed position of war
in international law. It has already been observed 1 that prior to World
War I, at least, the act of resorting to war was considered as neither legal
nor illegal but simply a fact, situation or event, occurring periodically in
state relations. According to this interpretation states retained the liberty
under customary international law to resort to war whenever they deemed
such action to be expedient. It followed that the decision by third states
to participate or to refrain from participating in war was, as the initial resort
to war itself, "not a matter for International Law but for international
politics.'' 2 Once war had broken out, third states, not immediately involved in the hostilities, were neither under a duty to participate nor to
refrain from participating in the hostilities. Similarly, belligerents were
at liberty to recognize or to refuse to recognize a status of non-participation
on the part of third states.
Those states which refrained from participating in a war occupied a status
of neutrality. The legal consequence of such non-participation, however,
may be found in the fact that it served to bring into operation certain rules,
rules presupposing an equality of legal status as between the belligerents
with respect to the war itself, hence the duty of non-participants to fulfill
their duties and to exercise their rights in an impartial manner toward belligerents. These rules-which may be termed the traditional law of neutrality-remained operative for the duration of a war or until such time as
a neutral state abandoned its position of non-participation-either by attacking one of the belligerents or by being attacked by a belligerent. 3
See pp. 3-4·
Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, op. cit., p. 653.
3
See pp. 196-2.02. for an analysis of the traditional concept of neutrality as well as of the
problems relating to the commencement and termination of this legal status.
1

2
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Given the obvious and close relationship between the position of war
under customary international law and the traditional legal institution of
neutrality, it must appear on first consideration that once the resort to "\Var
has been generally forbidden to states, neutrality-or, at the very least, the
specific consequences attached to a status of non-participation in war by
the traditional law-must be deprived of further legal justification. 4 This
conclusion, that the foundations of the traditional system of neutrality
have been overturned, appears particularly compelling to those who compare the obligations laid upon non-participants by the traditional system
with the obligations incurred by member states within the system of collective security established by the Charter of the United Nations. Indeed,
in view of recent developments many observers have ventured so far as to
question the continued feasibility of referring to the traditional legal institution of neutrality at all save in the historical sense.
But although the nature of the relationship traditionally obtaining between war and neutrality seems clear enough, the precise changes effected
in neutrality by the altered position of war are not as readily apparent as
has been frequently assumed. In order to analyze these changes more carefully it is useful to consider the obligations imposed and the rights conferred at present upon third states during a war in which they are not immediately and directly involved as active participants. These obligations
and rights may be considered both from the point of view of the General
Treaty For The Renunciation of War (the so-called Pact of Paris or KelloggBriand Pact) and from the potnt of view of the Charter of the United
Nations.

B. NEUTRALITY AND THE GENERAL TREATY FOR THE
RENUNCIATION OF WAR
According to the provisions of the General Treaty For the Renunciation
of War and, it may be assumed, according to present general international
law, 5 the resort to war is permitted to states only in the following circum4 " •••

the principle explanation and justification of the modern law of neutrality, conceived
as an attitude of absolute impartiality, has now disappeared. That explanation consisted in
the fact that, until the First World War, the right to wage war constituted an unlimited prerogative right of sovereign States; no neutral State, therefore, could arrogate to itself the right
to pass judgment on the legality of a war and to shape its conduct accordingly. The question
simply did not arise. In this respect the position has undergone a fundamental change. The
unlimited right of war is no longer a prerogative of the sovereign State. International law now
recognizes that a State may act unlawfully by the very act of declaring or going to war. It
admits the distinction between wars which are lawful and those which are not. To that extent
it has re-established the historic foundations of qualified-discriminatory and discriminatingneutrality." Lauterpacht, "The Limits of the Operation of the Law of War," p. 2.37.
5 A note on terminology may be in order here. The term "general" international law refers .
to rules binding upon all states and is to be contrasted with "particular" international law;
which refers to rules regulating the behavior only of certain states. Although it is possible
that both general and particular international law can consist of rules that are either customary
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stances: as a collective enforcement measure taken in accordance with the
obligations incurred within a general system of collective security, as a
measure of self-defense against a prior-and unlawful-resort to war, and
as a measure of collective defense taken on behalf of a state waging a lawful
war of self-defense. 6 Thus, apart from the obligations resulting from membership in the United Nations, states may now be considered as generally
forbidden to resort to war except as a measure of individual or collective
defense against a previous-and thereby unlawful-resort to war. 7
What, then, are the possible effects upon the institution of neutrality
brought about by this transformation in the legal position of war? It is
clear, to begin with, that under the General Treaty For the Renunciation of
or conventional in origin, it is usual to associate general international law with rules of a
customary origin and particular international law with rules of a conventional character.
This practice is seldom misleading. There may be significant exceptions, however, especially
with respect to conventional rules. Thus the almost universal adherence of states to the
General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, and the absence of any time limit set upon the
operation of its provisions, serve to give the rules contained therein a character closely akin to
that of general international law. In view of this fact the question as to whether or not the
position of war under customary international law has undergone change has been deprived, in
large measure, of its former significance. In this connection, however, it is submitted that the
correct view is that the legal position of war under customary law does not remain unaltered,
and that customary international law may now be considered as restricting the liberty of states
to resort to war in a manner substantially identical with the provisions contained in the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War. But this latter point need not be pressed.
6 The Preamble, in part, and the :first two Articles of this Treaty, signed August 2.7, 192.8,
read as follows:
"Convinced that all changes in their relations with one another should be sought only by
pacific means and be the result of a peaceful and orderly process, and that any signatory Power
which shall hereafter seek to promote its national interests by resort to war shall be denied the
benefits of this Treaty;
I The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples
that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce
it as an instrument of national policy with one another.
II The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or
conflicts, of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them,
shall never be sought except by pacific means."
7 In Article I of the Pact of Paris war is renounced as "an instrument of national policy."
However, it is clear that enforcement measures taken under then existing collective security
arrangements (principally, measures taken under Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations), and having the character of war, constituted a category of measures permitted by the
Pact. It is equally clear that enforcement measures taken under Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter fall within this same permitted category.-The right of self-defense is a necessary consequence of the Pact and was so recognized by the contracting parties at the time of
signature. The statement in the Pact's Preamble, that "any signatory Power which shall
hereafter seek to promote its national interests by resort to war shall be denied the benefits
furnished by this Treaty,'' has been interpreted as permitting othe~ contracting parties the right
to assist the state acting in self-defense. Thus in declaring war upon Germany in September
1939 Great Britain and France claimed to exercise a right conferred upon them by the Pact.
In this latter respect the similarity between the General Treaty For The Renunciation of War
and Article 5I of the United Nations Charter should be noted. (See pp. 177- 9).
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War there is neither an obligation on the part of third states to abandon a
status of non-participation in a war unlawfully initiated nor an obligation
to abandon any of the rights and duties attached to the status of nonparticipation by the traditional law of neutrality. To the extent that states
have not incurred obligations in excess of those imposed by the Pact of
Paris there seems little question but that non-participants in a war may
continue to invoke the traditional law of neutrality.
At the same time, by resorting to war in violation of its obligations under
the General Treaty For the Renunciation of War a state violates the rights
of all other contracting Parties. The latter are thereby entitled not only to
resort to war against the state so violating its obligations; they are also
entitled to take measures of reprisal against the aggressor that may not involve active participation in hostilities but that may involve a departure
from those duties otherwise imposed upon non-participants by the traditional law of neutrality. 8 Thus the measures of discrimination taken
against Germany in r94o-4r by the United States, although the United
States remained at the time a non-participant in the war, were partially
justified as measures of reprisal permitted to this country in consequence
of Germany's resort to war in alleged violation of the Pact of Paris. 9
s Admittedly, the position taken above has not been accepted by many writers. The Pact
of Paris does not expressly provide that contracting Parties may take discriminatory measures
against a violator of its provisions. It has therefore been claimed that the only benefit furnished
by the Treaty, which may be denied to states violating the Treaty's provisions, is the benefit
of not being made the object of a resort to war by the other contracting Parties. However,
states not participating in a war unlawfully initiated must observe a strict impartiality.-The
opposing view, given expression in the text, has been formulated in the following manner:
"The abrogation of the principle of impartiality is a legal effect which a multilateral treaty
prohibiting the resort to war has under general international law. The right to take enforcement measures short of war as reprisals against a violator of the treaty is derived directly from
general international law and exists even if not expressly stipulated by the treaty." Hans
Kelsen, Collective Srcurity Under International Law (U. S. Naval War College, International Law
Studies, I954), (r956), pp. r4s-6.
Also the opinion of Oppenheim-Lauterpacht (op. cit., pp. 644-5): "The guilty belligerent,
by breaking the Treaty, violates the rights of all other signatories, who, by way of reprisals,
may choose to subject him to measures of discrimination, for instance, either by actively prohibiting some or all exports into his territory or merely by submitting passively to otherwise
unlawful measures on the part of the offending belligerent." And for an earlier opinion that
parties to the Pact of Paris have the right to take discriminatory measures against a state
resorting to war in violation of the Pact, see "Budapest Articles of Interpretation," International
Law Association, Report of the 38th Conference, (1934). Nevertheless, a substantial n~_mber of
writers have never shared this interpretation of the Pact.
9 The Anglo-American Agreement of September 2., 1940, whereby the transfer of fifty destroyers to Great Britain was made in return for the right to lease naval and air bases, as well as
the "Act to Promote the Defense of the United States" (Lend-Lease Act), by which Congress
authorized the production and disposal of articles to "the government of any country whos~
defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States," were partially justifie_d
as being measures of reprisal against Germany for the latter's resort to war in violation of the
Pact of Paris. See u.s. Naval War College, International Law Documents, I940, PP· 74-90, rso-2.00,
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In view of the possibility th at th e Pact of Paris may be regarded as presently constituting general international law the right to discriminate
against a state violating the Pact's provisions may appear to signify a
fundamental change in the traditional legal institution of neutrality. In
fact, however, the significance of this change ought not to be overestimated .
In the absence of any further obligation to discriminate against an aggressor
those states not immediately involved in war will continue to invoke the
traditional law of neutrality-with its principle of strict impartialitywhenever they consider such action to be to their interests. The practice
of states in the period that has elapsed since the conclusion of the General
Treaty For The Renunciation of War furnishes impressive evidence in support of this observation.l 0
There is a further, and posdbly more serious, objection to be considered
in evaluating the contention that the General Treaty For The Renunciation
of War has effected a basic change in the traditional institution of neutrality. The Pact of Paris provides for no objective authority competent to
determine when a state has resorted to war in violation of the Pact's provlslons. In the absence of a procedure making possible an authoritative
and binding judgment that in a given instance a state has unlawfully resorted to war, each state must reach such determination independently.
and 132.-7, for documents relating to the destroyer-base agreement and for text of the LendLease Act.
In an address of March 2.7, 1941, before the Inter-American Bar Association the Attorney
General of the United States declared:
"The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 192.8, in which Germany, Italy, and Japan covenanted with us,
as well as with other nations, to renounce war as an instrument of policy, made definite the
outlawry of war and of necessity altered the dependent concept of neutral obligations . . .
The Treaty for the Renunciation of War and the Argentine Anti-War Treaty deprived their
signatories of the right of war as an instrument of national policy or aggression and rendered
unlawful wars undertaken in violation of their provisions. In consequence, these treaties
destroyed the historical and juridical foundations of the doctrine of neutrality conceived as an
attitude of absolute impartiality in relation to aggressive wars. It did not impose upon the
signatories the duty of discriminating against an aggressor, but it conferred upon them the right
to act in that manner." A.]. I. L., 35 (1941), pp. 353-410 In the period up to and including the second World War, the United States provided the
only significant example of a neutral state attempting to justify discriminatory behavior toward a belligerent by reference to the Kellogg-Briand Pact. It is necessary to add, however,
that the behavior of the United States in the period prior to 1940 would appear to deprive
even this one example of much of its significance. In the neutrality legislation enacted during
the period from 1934 through 1939 no recognition was given to the possible effects the Pact
of Paris might have upon the rights of non-participants in an unlawful war. Instead, it was
assumed that whatever the origin of the war the duties of non-participants under the traditional
law-and particularly the duty to refrain from discriminatory behavior-continued unimpaired.
It is also noteworthy that the resort to the Kellogg-Briand Pact as a justification for discriminatory measures against Germany never formed more than a partial justification for
American policy. In large measure, this discriminatory behavior continued to receive justification by reference to arguments whose relevance could be assessed only in terms of the
traditional law (seep. 198(n)).
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The possibility-or, perhaps more accurately, the probability-must be
envisaged that third states will differ in their respective judgments regarding the origin of a war. General international law may be interpreted as
presently permitting states to discriminate against an aggressor, but it cannot prevent third states from reaching mutually contradictory decisions
as to the identity of the aggressor. 11 The result must be wars in which
both sides are made the objects of discriminatory measures. It was precise! y this contingency-a product of the decentralization normally characteristic of the international legal order-that served historically as a partial justification, at least, for the traditional legal institution of neutrality
with its principle of strict impartiality. 12
Admittedly, this same argument may be used to call into question the
practical utility of the change that has occurred in the legal position of war
itself under general international law. For the mutually contradictory de11 In this respect the Pact of Paris clearly did not improve upon the situation that has always
characterized the application of customary international law. If anything, it provided a remarkable example of the futility of an international instrument which attempts to render
the resort to war illegal except when taken as a measure of self-defense against an illegal resort
to war, but takes no steps toward the solution of those problems which otherwise make the
value of such attempts extremely limited. All the important weaknesses of international
law are given express recognition in the Pact's provisions. Yet it attempted the solution of
a problem the existence of which was largely the result of those very weaknesses it expressly
recognized. Under the Pact each contracting party has the right to determine-for itself
only-whether a resort to war constitutes a violation of the Treaty or a measure of self-defense
permitted by the Treaty. It has been asserted that "elementary principles of interpretation
preclude a construction which gives to a state resorting to an alleged :war in self-defense the
right of ultimate determination, with a legally conclusive effect, of the legality of such action."
Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, op. cit., pp. 187-8. This is correct, if by "the right of ultimate determination, with a legally conclusive effect" is meant the right to decide the legality of an action
in a manner that other parties are bound to accept. It follows, then, that according to the
Kellogg-Briand Pact, and according to general international law, the final-and authoritativedecision as to the character of a war allegedly waged in self-defense must depend upon an express
agreement of the parties involved to submit disputed instances of self-defense to the decision
of an organ endowed with the requisite competence. In particular, decisions made unilaterally
by the victorious states following the conclusion of a war cannot be deemed to fulfill this
requirement. And it is hardly necessary to point out that even if such authoritative decisions
are finally rendered they do not resolve the difficulties of non-participants during the actual
course of the war.
12 Distinguish, however, between the foregoing criticism of the Pact of Paris and the
opinion that since "each nation was to be the exclusive and unreviewable judge of the. question
whether its war was one of self-defense . . . the Kellogg Pact has no legal force whatever ... ''
Edwin Borchard, "War, Neutrality and Non-Belligerency," A.]. I. L., 35 (1941), p. 62.2.. It
is one thing to assert that the utility of an international treaty prohibiting-in principle-the
resort to war will be severely limited if it leaves the interpretation and application of that
instrument to each of the contracting parties, and quite another thing to state that this condition of decentralization serves to deprive the treaty of "legal force." The latter assertion is
surely unwarranted, unless it be contended that most of the rules of international law-whose
interpretation and application is normally a product of the same condition of complete decentralization-have no "legal force."
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cisions non-participants must be expected to reach concerning the origin of
war will necessarily lead to an equal lack of uniformity in the actual participation of third states in hostilities. Under these circumstances the
former liberty to resort to war is likely to remain-in practice if not in
law-the prerogative of each state. At the same time, however, the former duty of non-participants to observe the rules laid down by the traditional law of neutrality presumably would be abandoned. This rather
paradoxical result can hardly be considered an improvement over the traditional law. Nevertheless, it may be said to follow from the attempt
merely to place restrictions upon the liberty of states to resort to war while
failing to provide a procedure whereby an authoritative determination can
be made that in a given instance a state has resorted to war unlawfully.
And it is for this reason that although the traditional law of neutrality
grew out of, and received its principal justification from, the unlimited
liberty of states to resort to war, a change in the legal position of war does
not necessarily imply the desirability of modifying-let alone abolishingthe duties imposed and the rights conferred upon non-participants by this
traditionallaw.I3

C. NEUTRALITY UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS
Under the collective security system established by the Charter of the
United Nations, Member states no longer possess, in principle, the freedom
either to refrain from actively participating in a war that has taken on the
character of a United Nations enforcement action, or-should they not be
called upon by the Security Council to take military measures-to observe
the duty of impartiality as laid down by the traditionallaw. 14 This general observation must presuppose, of course, that the Security Council is
able to exercise effectively those functions conferred upon it by the Charter.
Even so, there is the possibility of distinguishing between several kinds of
situations.
According to Article 39 of the Charter the Security Council shall decide,
in the event it determines the existence of a threat to or breach of the peace,
what measures shall be taken in order to maintain or restore international
13 And it is presumably for the same reason that the Harvard Draft Convention On Rights and
Duties of States in Case of Aggression (op. cit., pp. 82.1 ff), while permitting third states to take

discriminatory measures against an aggressor, nevertheless limited the applicability of the
Draft Convention to "cases where a resort to armed force has been in violation of a legal obligation not to resort to such means and where such violation has been duly determined by a procedure
to which the law-breaking State has previously agreed" (p. 82.5), [italics added].
14 A substantial portion of the discussion immediately to follow in the text represents a
reformulation of problems earlier examined in Chapter I (see pp. 13-2.0). Perhaps the best
analysis to date of the possible effect that the United Nations Charter may have upon the
traditional institution of neutrality is J. F. Lalive, "International Organization and Neutrality," B. Y. I. L., 2.4 (1947), p. So.
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peace and security. These measures may consist of acts not involving
(Article 41) or involving (Article 42.) the use of armed force. In this connection, it is important to observe that the unlawful resort to armed force
by a Member of the United Nations neither automatically involves other
Member states in war with the delinquent state nor places upon Member
states even the obligation to resort to war. The obligation to resort to
rneasures involving the use of armed force follows only upon the requisite
decision by the Security Council, and actual involvement in hostilities
occurs only when the Member state has carried out the obligation imposed
upon it by the Security Council.l 5
It is altogether possible, therefore, that in the event of an enforcement
action ordered by the Security Council certain Member states may not be
required to participate with their armed forces. 16 Article 48 of the Charter
contemplates this possibility by providing that the "action required to
carry out the decisions of the Security Council . . . shall be taken by all
the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security
Council may determine." Hence, the opinion that the effective operation by
the Security Council of the powers granted it under the Charter precludes
the possibility that Member states may retain a status of neutrality in a war
15

Under the collective security system established by the Covenant of the League of Nations
each Member state retained the right to determine for itself whether another Member state
had resorted to war in violation of its obligations. The League Council could give its opinion
as to whether a breach of the Covenan:t had occurred, but the Council's opinion was not binding
upon Members. According to Article r6, paragraph r, of the Covenant it was provided that:
"Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles
12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other
Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance
of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals
and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the
nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not.'' This provision has
been correctly described as a legal fiction "since the Members against which the delinquent
Member did not resort to war are actually not in a state of war and are not obliged to resort to
war against the delinquent state." Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (1952), p. 86.
So long as each Member of the League did not itself decide that another Member had unlawfully
resorted to war, the obligations imposed by Article r6 did not become operative. Even after
having so decided there was no obligation to resort to war against the delinquent, although
there was an obligation to take certain measures ofdiscrimination, largely economic in character (and, according to paragraph 3 of Article r6, the further obligation to "take the necessary
steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League
which are cooperating to protect the Covenants of the League.")
16 It is also relevant to recall that the obligation of Member states to take measures of
armed force pro;vided for in Article 42 is probably dependent upon the conclusion of the special
agreements provided for in Article 43· These agreements, to be concluded between the Security
Council and Member states, are to regulate the conditions under which the armed forces and
facilities of the Member states will be made available to the Council. However, in the absence
of such agreements it is doubtful that the Security Council is competent to obligate Member
states to take military measures against a state considered by the Council to have committed
a threat to or breach of the peace.
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that has the character of a United Nations enforcement action is correct
only if neutrality is identified with the duties imposed upon non-participants
by the traditional law, and particularly with the duty to observe a strict
impartiality.
It is considered preferable, however, to identify neutrality simply with
the status of non-participation in hostilities, and not with the specific consequences that are attached to the status of non-participation according to
the traditional law. 17 H this concept of neutrality is accepted then it is
clear that in an enforcement action taken by the United Nations that has
the characteristics of war some Member states may remain neutral, in the
sense that they are not required to participate in the hostilities. However, the consequences attached to such non-participation are not the
consequences attached to the status of non-participation by the traditional
law, for Member states are obligated by the Charter to assist the Organization by measures not involving the use of armed force and to refrain from
rendering any assistance to state(s) against which enforcement action is
taken. 18
17 See pp. 196-8. Though not accepted by perhaps the majority of writers, this identification
of neutrality with non-participation in war need not pose any difficulty here. Whether accepted
or not there is at least a clear distinction to be drawn between a status of non-participation in
hostilities which does entail the duties imposed by the traditional law (particularly the duty
to observe a strict impartiality toward the belligerents), and a status of non-participation
which may impose a duty as well as confer a right upon a state to discriminate against the side
that has unlawfully resorted to war. In the latter case the discriminatory measures taken by
non-participants have their basis in norms constituting a general system of collective security.
In the former case departure from the duties imposed upon non-participants by the traditional
law has no apparent justification and gives rise to a belligerent right of reprisal.
18 The discussion in the text necessarily assumes that in an enforcement action ordered by the
Security Council Member states are obligated, even without specific direction by the Council,
to depart from a position of strict impartiality and to discriminate against the delinquent state.
In other terms, this assumption interprets Article 2., paragraph 5, as being automatic in its
application to Member states. It is possible, though, to interpret Article 2., paragraph 5, as
obligating states to take measures of discrimination only when so directed by the Security
Council (this interpretation draws added weight if Article 2., paragraph 5, is considered to·
gether with Article 48). In the absence of such direction a Member state could then remain
neutral and observe a strict impartiality. But there is little doubt that this latter interpretation
is contrary to the principles upon which the collective security system established by the
Charter is based. (Also see Law of Naval Warfare, Article 2.32..) At the same time, it would
appear that in the light of recent developments a state may be accepted as a Member even
though it is committed to a status of permanent neutrality, a status entailing not only the obligation to refrain from resorting to war against any state-save in self defense-but also the obligation to observe all the duties imposed upon non-participants by the traditional law. Thus in
1955 Austria was admitted as a Member state despite its announced intention to adopt a policy
of permanent neutrality, and its request to all states to recognize this status. To date, Austria's
request has been accorded recognition by a substantial number of states, including the permanent
Members of the Security Council. On first consideration, the status of permanent neutrality
appears clearly incompatible with membership in the United Nations (an opinion expressed
by the framers of the Charter). Nevertheless, Professor Verdross, writing before Austria's
admission into the United Nations, has declared that the Security Council "can decide freely
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The position of a state that refrains from active participation in hostilities, but nevertheless resorts-in accordance with obligations undertaken
within a system of collective security-to discriminatory measures against
one side in a war, has frequently been termed ''qualified'' or ''differential''
neutrality. 19 During the League of Nations period a good deal of speculation was devoted to the possibility of states occupying a position of qualified neutrality, and was occasioned by the obligations imposed upon Member states by the Covenant of the League of Nations to take measures of
discrimination-primarily economic in character-against another Member
state that had unlawfully resorted to war. A similar problem arises with
which Members it wants to execute sanctions and compulsory measures and to what extent·
The Security Council may therefore permanently relieve individual Members of these obligations
by a resolution embodying a principle. Only the Security Council would be able to alter or
annul such a resolution . . . " "Austria's Permanent Neutrality and the United Nations Organization," A.]. I. L., so (19s6), p. 66. In dealing with the same issue Professor Kunz has more
recently stated that even if the Security Council does not adopt such a resolution "it seems that
Austria's permanent neutrality is not endangered by its membership . . . For Austria's permanent neutrality has come into existence in international law by recognition on the part of
the permanent members of the Security Council and many other states; recognition binds the
recognizing states to respect permanent neutrality; this respect for permanent neutrality therefore obliges the members of the Security Council not to call on a permanently neutral state for
participation in economic and military sanctions." "Austria's Permanent Neutrality,"
A.]. 1. L., so (19s6), p. 42.4. It is clear, however, that the situation of Austria is exceptional,
and does not detract from the statements made above concerning the obligation of other Member
states to accord assistance to the Organization by virtue of Article 2., paragraph s. Moreover,
Austria's membership is not, as Kunz points out, "unconditional," since it does not entail all
of the obligations normally imposed upon Members.
19 The terminology employed by writers to describe the position of the discriminating nonparticipant is not always consistent, however, and this fact may account for some of the confusion that has accompanied discussions of "qualified" or "differential" neutrality. Some
writers (e. g., Guggenheim, Traite de Droit International Puhlic, Vol. II, pp. 496-soo) use the
term "qualified" neutrality to indicate the position of non-participants that assert a right
(though not a duty) to assist the victim of an unlawful resort to war, primarily as a consequence
of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and thereby distinguish between the position of "qualified" neutrals and the position of non-participants under the Charter of the United Nations. Other
writers (e. g., Verdross, Vijtkerrecht, pp. 42.4, s2.s-6) appear to use the terms "qualified" or
"differential" neutrality to describe the position of non-participants that follow-for any
reason-a policy of discrimination. In this sense, "differential" neutrality may refer to the
position of Member states of the United Nations as well as to non-participants that remain
bound by the rules of the traditionallaw.-It would appear desirable, however, to use the terms
"qualified" or "differential" neutrality either to describe the position of states that have
hoth a right and a duty to discriminate against an aggressor (e. g., the position of states Members
of the United Nations) or to describe the position of non-participants having only a right of
discriminating against a state unlawfully resorting to war (e. g., by virtue of the KelloggBriand Pact). In theory at least, it is true that there is a significant difference between these
two types of "qualified" or "differential" neutrality. But if the duty to discriminate again&t
an aggressor cannot be effectively implemented the difference between these two types is likely
to prove-in practice-very small. On the other hand, the term "non-belligerent" may be
reserved to describe the position of a non-participant that departs from the duties imposed
upon the latter by the traditional law without having a right to do so (see pp. 191-3, 198-9).
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respect to the position of Member states in an enforcement action undertaken by the United Nations.
To the extent that the idea of a qualified or differential neutrality has
been based upon the contention that the impartiality required of nonparticipants by the traditional law refers only to military matters (thus
permitting discriminatory acts with respect to non-military matters), it
must be regarded as unfounded. In fact, it was hardly possible to reconcile
the obligations assumed by Member states under the Covenant with the
obligations imposed by the traditionallaw. 20 Member states could refrain
from participating in a war against another Member state that had unlawfully resorted to war. They could not-consistently with their obligations
under the Covenent-observe a strict impartiality. But under the Covenant
all Member states expressly assumed the obligation to permit measures of
discrimination to be taken against them in the event they resorted to war
in violation of their obligations; for in this event they forfeited the rights
formerly enjoyed by belligerents with respect to non-participants, though
retaining all of the belligerent's duties. The same reasoning must also
apply to United Nations enforcement actions. Of course, the real difficulty
here is not primarily legal but political in character. Will the aggressor
tolerate discriminatory measures on the part of non-participants? Experience to date has not yet furnished sufficient indication as to how meaningful,
in practice, the position of a discriminating non-participant may be. If
anything, it seems probable that this position-if seriously pursuedwould necessarily prove difficult to maintain. 21
The preceding remarks have dealt only with the effect the Charter of the
United Nations may have upon neutrality so far as Member states are
concerned, presupposing, of course, the effective operation by the Security
This was illustrated in the case of Switzerland. In admitting Switzerland to the League
the Council of the League declared that Switzerland had no obligation to undertake military
measures against a violator or to permit the passage of troops through Swiss territory. Nevertheless, the obligation to take economic and financial sanctions against a Member state unlawfully resorting to war was retained. In order to reconcile this latter obligation with her
traditional status of permanent neutrality the Swiss Government contended for some time-as did a number of Swiss writers-that a strict neutrality was compatible with an "economic
partiality," that the impartiality demanded of neutrals by the traditional law referred only to
the military, not to the economic sphere. This opinion was quickly abandoned, however, during
the Italo-Ethiopian War, when economic sanctions were taken against Italy by League members.
Shortly thereafter, in 1938, Switzerland declared it would no longer consider itself bound by
the obligation to participate in sanctions of an economic character, thereby abandoning a
position of "qualified" or "differential" neutrality.
21 In the Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935-36, a limited application of the so-called "differential"
neutrality provided for in Article 16 of the Covenant was attempted. Several Members applied
discriminatory measures of an economic character against Italy, while maintaining that Italy
should observe those duties toward the discriminating states imposed upon belligerents by
the traditional law. But this case can hardly be considered as decisive in illustrating the
political feasibility of a "qualified" or "differential'' neutrality. By 1938 it was generally
recognized that Article 16 was no longer obligatory for Member states of the League.
20
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Council of the powers conferred upon it by the Charter. A further problem
relates to the effect the Charter may have upon neutrality as far as nonMember states are concerned. The answer to this problem must depend
largely upon whether or not the law of the United Nations may be considered as constituting general international law. Despite the claim in
Article 2, paragraph 6, it is doubtful that the Charter can be considered as
constituting general internationallaw. 22 Accordingly, it is also doubtful
that the Security Council possesses the competence to require that nonMember states, in a United Nations enforce1nent action, depart from a
position of strict impartiality. 23
22

Article 2, paragraph 6 reads: "The Organization shall ensure that states which are not
Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary
for the maintenance of international peace and security." Among writers, the majority
seem to remain quite skeptical of the validity of Article 2, paragraph 6, so far as non-Members
are concerned. Thus Lalive (op. cit., p. 85) writes that there is "room for doubt whether the
Charter can lawfully be invoked against a non-Member state," and Kelsen (The Law of the
United Nations, p. IIo) states that "from the point of view of existing international law, the
attempt of the Charter to apply to states which are not contracting parties to it must be characterized as revolutionary." It has even been pointed out that it is not necessary to interpret
Article 2, paragraph 6, as imposing obligations upon non-Members but only upon Members.
"The Charter, in Article 2 (6), imposes upon the United Nations the obligation to ensure that
non-Members act in accordance with its principles as far as may be necessary for the maintenance
of international peace and security. Non-Members are not bound by this provision and they
may choose to react accordingly. But the fact makes no difference to the obligations of the
Members . . . in all cases in which the Security Council has taken affirmative action under
Articles 39, 41 and 42." Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, op. cit., p. 652.
23 Within the United Nations itself the problem of the status of non-Members during an enforcement action was discussed in connection with the Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties
of States, prepared by the International Law Commission in conformity with Resolution 178
(II) of the General Assembly, November 21, 1947 (U. N. General Assembly, Official Records,
4th Sess. Supp. IO (Doc. A/1925).)
Articles 9, 10 and 12 of the Draft Declaration state: "Article 9· Every state has the duty
to refrain from resorting to war as an instrument of national policy, and to refrain from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state,
or in any other manner inconsistent with international law and order.
"Article 10. Every state has the duty to refrain from giving assistance to any state which
is acting in violation of Article 9, or against which the United Nations is taking preventive or
enforcement action.
·'Article 12. Every state has the right of individual or collective self-defense against armed
attack."
The Draft Declaration does not itself constitute positive international law, and as an attempt
even to formulate existing general international law it has been subject to much criticism.
Even so, Article 10 of the Draft Declaration clearly does not attempt to endorse the claim
made by Article 2, paragraph 6, of the Charter. "Every State," which includes non-Member states, is not under the obligation to discriminate against any state made the object of
United Nations enforcement action, but is obligated only to refrain -from giving assistance to
states made the object of such action. To this extent the obligation laid down in Article 10
of the Draft upon non-Member states is no different from the obligation they would otherwise
have according to the traditional law, requiring as it does that non-participants in a· war refrain
from discriminatory measures and observe an attitude of impartiality toward the belligerents.
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The problem relating to the Charter's effect upon the status of nonMembers in a United Nations enforcement action is likely to prove relatively
unimportant in practice, however. Should the Security Council be able
effectively to exercise those powers conferred upon it by the Charter nonMember states would, as one writer has observed, "be politically alive to
the possible consequence of action in defiance of the United Nations." 24
It is the unlikelihood of such effective exercise of power by the Security
Council that renders continued speculation over this problem of distinctly
limited value.
More useful, therefore, is a consideration of the far more probable situation in which the Security Council will be unable either to order enforcement measures against a state that has unlawfully resorted to the use of
armed force or even to determine the existence of a breach of the peaceas it was able to do at the time of the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. 25 In
the event of Security Council inaction the position of Member states not
immediately involved in hostilities. will be substantially the same as the
position of third states-not immediately involved in war-under general
international law. Neither Article 51 of the Charter nor the General Assembly's resolution "Uniting for Peace" provide alternative methods
whereby an authoritative and binding collective determination can be
reached that a state has unlawfully resorted to the use of armed force. 26 It
Philip C. Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations, p. r68. The above observation-to be suredoes not dispose of the strictly legal considerations.
25 See pp. r6-8, where it has already been observed that the character of these Security
Council resolutions renders doubtful the interpretation that the Korean action was a "United
Nations' action" in the strict sense of that term. It is still more doubtful that Member
states were under the obligation, imposed by Article 2., paragraph 5, to give the United Nations
"every assistance in any action" the Organization takes in accordance with the Charter. For
these reasons the contention that a strict impartiality in the Korean Conflict was legally excluded for Member states appears unacceptable. At the same time, the particular circumstances
attending the Korean conflict, and especially the circumstance that the Security Council was
able to determine the existence of a breach of the peace, does allow the interpretation that
Member states were obligated to refrain from giving any assistance to the North Korean forces
or to states acting in support of these forces.
In practice, questions concerning neutral-belligerent relations were never put to a real test
in the Korean conflict, due to the geographical location as well as to the peculiar nature of the
hostilities. But several Member states of the United Nations did maintain a position practically indistinguishable from that of non-participants under the traditional law. For a review
of the Korean conflict and neutrality, see H. J. Taubenfeld, "International Actions and Neutrality," A.]. I. L., 47 (1953), pp. 39o-6.
26 See pp. r8--2.o.
In the first Report (1951) of the Collective Measures Committee (U.N. Doc.
A/r89r), established pursuant to the "Uniting For Peace" resolution, considerable emphasis
was placed upon the desirability of obtaining universal support for the collective measures
recommended in accordance with this Resolution. Thus one of the Reports "guiding principles
of general application" was that: "All States should support the United Nations when it
undertakes collective measures and participate to the fullest extent possible in carrying them
out . . . . " Such recommendations as may be made to states, both Members and non-Members,
in accordance with the "Uniting For Peace" resolution, cannot serve to create obligations,
however.
24
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is equally clear that apart from the powers granted the Security Council
under Chapter VII, the collective security system established by the Charter
provides no alternative method for obligating Member states either to take
measures involving the use of armed force or to take measures of discrimination not involving the use of armed force against a state that is regarded as
having violated its obligations under the Charter by resorting to war.
Hence, in the event that the Security Council is unable to fulfill its functions Member states may, in the event of war, abstain from all participation
in hostilities and observe a strict impartiality. 27
It is quite true that under Article 51 the Charter does confer upon Members the right to assist any Member state that has been made the victim of
an "armed attack," and this right is terminated only when the Security
Council has taken" measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security." Nor is there any reason for interpreting Article 51 as permitting only such assistance on behalf of the victim of an armed attack as
involves the use of armed force. The "collective self-defense" allowed
under Article 51 also permits measures of discrimination against an alleged
aggressor that do not necessarily involve the discriminating states' active
participation in hostilities.
Thus, according to the Charter, the right to participate in the collective
defense of a state r.nade the object of an unlawful resort to war may be
considered to include the right to discriminate against the aggressor by
measures falling short of active participation in hostilities. But the
difficulties attending the exercise of this right to discriminate against an
alleged aggressor are as readily apparent in relation to the Charter as they
27 Nor can there be much doubt that-events permitting-a substantial number of Membe
states would do just this. There is, in fact, little point in continuing to place undue emphasiS
upon the possible effects the collective security system established by the Charter may have upon
neutrality. For that system has never functioned as originally intended, and it is at least
highly unlikely that it will do so in the foreseeable future. It is almost equally unlikely that
the modest experiment in "collective security" effected during the Korean hostilities will be
repeated, dependent as it would have to be upon the same fortuitous circumstances which
permitted the Security Council to take in June and July of 1950 a limited form of action. And
even during the Korean conflict not only did a number of Member states consider themselves to
occupy a position of "neutrality" in relation to the hostilities, but the armistice terminating
the hostilities provided for a "commission of neutrals" to insure its observance (though,
ironically, four of the five states composing this" commission of neutrals" were Member states
ot the United Nations). It is true that no state issued a formal declaration of neutraUty during
the Korean conflict or actually invoked the traditional law of neutrality. It is also true that
the accuracy of the term "neutral" with respect to the states policing the Korean armistice
may be easily challenged from a technical point of view. But it would be quite unwarranted
to dismiss the overall significance of these, and other, recent developments, which indic~tte
that neutrality-even the "old-style neutrality"-may have to be disinterred once again by
those who had buried it in the hope that the principle of collective security had finally m.a:de
this traditional institution obsolescent. Certainly, the framers of the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Treatment of the Victims of War did not share this view, for these Conventions
assign important functions to neutral states.
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are when considered in relation to the General Treaty For the Renunciation
of War. It may be assumed that under Article 51 of the Charter states will
reach the same mutually contradictory decisions concerning the origin of
a war with the result that both sides to a conflict will be made the objects
of discriminatory measures. 28
This undesirable situation will not be relieved by the transformation of
the right of collective defense, granted under Article 51 of the Charter,
into a duty. The conclusion of agreements implementing the right of
collective defense may indeed severely limit the possibility of states retaining the right to refrain from participating in a war, or, if allowed to remain
in a non-participant status, to observe an attitude of impartiality. 29 It
28 More than one writer has accorded clear recognition to the undesirable consequences to
which this situation would probably lead. Thus, Professor Jessup (op. cit., p. 2.05) in considering
the possibility of an outbreak of war unaccompanied by the binding decision of a competent
"international authority" (in this case the United Nations Security Council) declares:
"If the legal position of non-participants in the conflict is to be regulated by some international agreement short of a return to the old status of war and neutrality, it would be disastrous to agree that every state may decide for itself which of the two contestants is in the
right and may govern its conduct according to its own decision, even if it were agreed that they
would not actually support one or the other side by force . . . . There is no alternative except
to extend throughout the duration of the conflict the system of impartial blockade against
both parties to the fighting."
The essence of this proposal is a mixture of both old and new. States are generally forbidden
to resort to war. But if war should break out-and be unaccompanied by the binding decision
of a competent "international authority"-third states are forbidden to participate, either for
reasons formerly admitted by the traditional law or for reason of collective defense on behalf
of the alleged victim. Nor are non-participants to be allowed to discriminate against an alleged
aggressor. Instead, the position of third states is to resemble the position of non-participants
under the traditional law, with the important exception thac private neutral trade with the
belligerents-allowed by the traditional law-is to be forbidden. The proposal recalls somewhat similar suggestions made in the period preceding World War II, to the effect that an
enforced isolation of the belligerents would reduce the danger of conflict spreading and induce
the belligerents to cease hostilities. Apart from its possible merits, and they are not inconsiderable, it should be observed that this proposal is at variance both with the General Treaty
For the Renunciation of War and with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
29 Here again, however, the compatibility of neutrality and collective defense agreements
will depend, in practice, not only upon the nature of the obligations incurred but also upon
the procedure that is provided for determining the existence of those circumstances (i. e., an
"armed attack") serving to bring the obligations in question into operation. Thus, Article 5
of the North Atlantic Treaty, concluded at Washington, April 4, 1949, reads:
"The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North
America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if
such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective
self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party
or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with other Parties,
such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the
security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result
thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated
when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.''
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may also be that these agreements confer upon a central organ competence
to determine when the duty of collective defense must be fulfilled, and even
the extent of this duty. But such decisions are binding only upon the
contracting parties to the agreement. It must be expected, therefore, that
different decisions will be reached by those states parties to different-and,
presumably, opposed-collective defense agreements. In this situation
the resort by non-participants to measures of discrimination may only
serve to provoke retaliatory measures on the part of the state against which
they are taken. Nor will it normally prove possible during the course of
a war to determine that acts of retaliation on the part of the alleged aggressor are without legal justification.
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